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Abstract. How to achieve differential privacy in the distributed set-
ting, where the dataset is distributed among the distrustful parties, is
an important problem. We consider in what condition can a protocol
inherit the differential privacy property of a function it computes. The
heart of the problem is the secure multiparty computation of randomized
function. A notion obliviousness is introduced, which captures the key
security problems when computing a randomized function from a deter-
ministic one in the distributed setting. By this observation, a sufficient
and necessary condition about computing a randomized function from
a deterministic one is given. The above result can not only be used to
determine whether a protocol computing differentially private function
is secure, but also be used to construct secure one. Then we prove that
the differential privacy property of a function can be inherited by the
protocol computing it if the protocol privately computes it. A compo-
sition theorem of differentially private protocols is also presented. We
also construct some protocols to generate random variate in the dis-
tributed setting, such as the uniform random variates and the inversion
method. By using these fundamental protocols, we construct protocols of
the Gaussian mechanism, the Laplace mechanism and the Exponential
mechanism. Importantly, all these protocols satisfy obliviousness and so
can be proved to be secure in a simulation based manner. We also provide
a complexity bound of computing randomized function in the distribute
setting. Finally, to show that our results are fundamental and powerful
to multiparty differential privacy, we construct a differentially private
empirical risk minimization protocol.
Keywords: multiparty differential privacy, random variate generation,
secure multiparty computation, randomized function, obliviousness
1 Introduction
Nowadays, a lot of personal information are collected and stored in many databases.
Each database is owned by a particular autonomous entity, e.g., financial data
by banks, medical data by hospitals, online shopping data by e-commerce com-
panies, online searching records by search engine companies, income data by
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tax agencies. Some entities may want to mine useful information among these
databases. For example, insurance companies may want to analyze the insur-
ance risk of some group by mining both the bank’s database and the hospital’s
database, or several banks may want to aggregate their databases to estimate
the loan risk in some area, or, more generally, one may want to learn a classi-
fier among these private databases [1]. However, due to privacy consideration,
data integrating or data mining among these databases should be conducted in
a privacy-preserving way: First, one must perform computations on database
that must be kept private and there is no single entity that is allowed to see
all the databases on which the analysis is run; Second, it is not a priori clear
whether the analysis results contain sensitive information traceable back to par-
ticular individuals [2,3]. The first privacy problem is the research field of secure
MultiParty Computation (MPC) [4]. However, since standard MPC does not
analyze and prevent what is (implicitly) leaked by the analysis results [5,6], the
second privacy problem can not be treated by MPC. Fortunately, the second
privacy problem could be analyzed by differential privacy (DP) [7,8], which is a
mathematically rigorous privacy model that has recently received a significant
amount of research attention for its robustness to known attacks, such as those
involving side information [2,3]. Therefore, solving the above privacy problems
needs the combination of MPC and DP as a tool.
There is a misunderstanding that the above problem can easily be solved
without using MPC: Each party first locally analyzes and perturbs the local
data using the appropriate differentially private algorithm and then outputs the
result; These results are then synthesized to obtain the final result. Obviously,
the final result satisfies differential privacy. However, the above method will
either add more noise to the final result, such as in the noise mechanism [8], or
need redesign of the related algorithm, such as in the exponential mechanism
[9], which would be a more hard work.
We now present the considered problem in a more formal way. Let a dataset
x = (x1, . . . , xn) be distributed among the mutually distrustful parties P1, . . . , Pn,
where xi is owned by Pi. We call the above dataset owning condition by the dis-
tributed setting. The parties want to implement differentially private analyses
in the distributed setting by the following way: First choose what to compute,
i.e., a differentially private function M(x); Then decide how to compute it, i.e.,
construct an MPC protocol to compute M(x). In the paper we only treat the
second step. That is, we assume that there has been a differentially private al-
gorithm M(x) in the client-server setting. Our task is to construct an MPC
protocol π to compute M(x) in the distributed setting. Furthermore, it is vital
that π should ‘inherit’ the differential privacy property ofM(x). That is, in ex-
ecuting π, each party’s view (or each subgroup of the parties’ views) should be
differentially private to other parties’ private data. However, constructing such
protocol is challenging. To see that, we consider two examples appeared in the
related works to construct differentially private protocols.
Example 1 (Gaussian mechanism). The party Pi has the math score list xi of
Class i for i = 1, 2. P1, P2 are willing to count the total number of the students
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whose score ≥ 60 in x1 and x2, while letting the score list one party owns to be
secret to the other and letting the output f(x1, x2) satisfies differential privacy,
where f is the counting function. We use Gaussian mechanism to achieve differ-
ential privacy, i.e., adding Gaussian noise to f(x1, x2). Note that the sensitivity
of f is ∆f = 1. Therefore, we can add a random number N ∼ N (0, σ2) to
achieve (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy, where σ >
√
2 ln 1.25/δ/ǫ [7, page 471]. There
are two intuitive protocols to achieve the task:
1. Each Pi generates a random number Ni ∼ N (0, σ2/2) and computes oi =
f(xi) +Ni locally. P1, P2 then compute o1 + o2 using an MPC protocol and
output the result o. Note that o = f(x1, x2) + (N1 + N2) since f(x1, x2) =
f(x1)+f(x2) and that (N1+N2) ∼ N (0, σ2) due to the infinitely divisibility
of Gaussian noise.
2. Each Pi generates a random number N
′
i ∼ N (0, σ2) locally. P1, P2 then
compute and output o = f(x1)+f(x2)+LT(N
′
1, N
′
2) using an MPC protocol,
where LT(N ′1, N
′
2) outputs the smaller one in N
′
1, N
′
2.
Intuitively, both of the two protocols in Example 1 satisfy (ǫ, δ)-differential
privacy since both of them add noises drawn fromN (0, σ2) to f(x1, x2). However,
to the first protocol, if P1 computes o−N1 it obtains the vale of f(x1, x2)+N2.
Since N2 ∼ N (0, σ2/2) but not N2 ∼ N (0, σ2), P1 obtains an output not satis-
fying (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy. To the second protocol, either N ′1 = LT(N
′
1, N
′
2)
or N ′2 = LT(N
′
1, N
′
2). Without loss of generality, assuming N
′
1 = LT(N
′
1, N
′
2),
P1 can then compute the value of o − N ′1 to obtain f(x1, x2), which obviously
violates differential privacy. A similar protocol, which has the similar drawback
as the second protocol, is used to generate Laplace noise in the distributed set-
ting in [1]. Therefore, both of the two protocols in Example 1 do not inherit the
(ǫ, δ)-differential privacy property of the function they compute.
Example 2 (Laplace mechanism). The same as Example 1, P1, P2 want to out-
put f(x1, x2). In this time, they use Laplace mechanism to achieve differential
privacy, i.e., adding Laplace noise to f(x1, x2). Since ∆f = 1, they can add a
random number N ∼ Lap(1/ǫ) to achieve ǫ-differential privacy. They construct a
protocol as follows: Each party Pi generates two random numbers Yi1, Yi2 drawn
from N (0, 1/√2ǫ) locally. The parties then use an MPC protocol to compute
o = f(x1, x2) +N and output o, where N ←
∑
i(Y
2
i1 − Y 2i2).
The above protocol is shown in [10,11,12]. However, we conclude that it does
not inherit the ǫ-differential privacy property of the function it computes. The
reason is that P1 can obtain the value of f(x1, x2) + (Y
2
21 − Y 222) by subtracting
(Y 211− Y 212) from o. However, since the distribution function of (Y 221− Y 222) is not
Lap(1/ǫ) the value of f(x1, x2)+(Y
2
21−Y 222) will not satisfy ǫ-differential privacy.
From Example 1 and Example 2 we see that it is difficult to construct a
protocol that can inherit the differential privacy property of the function it
computes. The crux of the difficulty is that differentially private function is a
kind of randomized function, whose output is a random element drawn from a
prescribed distribution function (please see Definition 1 in Section 2.2) and that
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the result about computing randomized function in MPC is rare. In the paper we
will develop some theoretical results about computing randomized function in
the distributed setting and then treat the above inheritance problem. Note that
differentially private function and random variate are two kinds of randomized
function: with constant inputs for the second one.
1.1 Contribution
Our contributions are as follows.
First, we provide a special security definition of computing randomized func-
tion in the distributed setting, in which a new notion obliviousness is introduced.
Obliviousness captures the key security problems when computing a randomized
function from a deterministic one. By this observation, we provide a sufficient
and necessary condition (Theorem 3) about computing a randomized function
from a deterministic one. The above result can not only be used to determine
whether a protocol computing a randomized function (and therefore computing
a differentially private function) is secure, but also be used to construct secure
one. To the best of our knowledge, ours (Theorem 3) is the first to provide a
sufficient and necessary condition about this problem.
Second, we prove that a differentially private algorithm can preserve differ-
ential privacy property in the distributed setting if the protocol computing it is
secure (Theorem 4), i.e., the inheritance problem. We also introduce the com-
position theorem of differential privacy in the distributed setting (Theorem 5).
To the best of our knowledge, the paper is the first to present these results in
differential privacy.
Third, we construct some fundamental protocols to generate random variate
in the distributed setting, such as Protocol 4 and Protocol 7. By using these
fundamental protocols, we construct protocols of the Gaussian mechanism (Pro-
tocol 8), the Laplace mechanism (Protocol 9) and the Exponential mechanism
(Protocol 10 and Protocol 11). To the best of our knowledge, Protocol 11 is the
first exponential mechanism to treat high-dimensional continuous range in the
distributed setting. Importantly, all these protocols satisfy obliviousness and,
therefore, can be proved to be secure in a simulation based manner by using
the conclusion of Theorem 3. Furthermore, The later four protocols inherit the
differential privacy property of the function they compute.
Forth, we provide a complexity bound of multiparty computation of random-
ized function, which show the intrinsic complexity of the method the paper use
to achieve obliviousness, i.e., bits XOR.
Finally, to show that the protocols in Section 5 are powerful and fundamen-
tal, we constructed a differentially private empirical risk minimization (ERM)
protocol in the distributed setting by using the protocols in Section 5.
1.2 Outline
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the
Shamir’s secret sharing scheme, differential privacy definition and non-uniform
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random variate generation. Section 3 discusses the security of the protocol com-
puting randomized function. Section 4 mainly discusses how can a protocol in-
herit the differential privacy property of a function it computes. The composition
theorem of differentially private protocols is also given. Section 5 constructs some
fundamental protocols to generate random variates in the distributed setting. It
also provides the Gaussian mechanism, the Laplace mechanism and the expo-
nential mechanism in the distributed setting. Section 5.5 applies the protocols
in Section 5 to solve the empirical risk minimization problem. Section 6 presents
related works. Finally, concluding remarks and a discussion of future work are
presented in Section 7.
2 Preliminary
2.1 Secure Multiparty Computation Framework
MPC enables n parties P1, . . . , Pn jointly evaluate a prescribed function on pri-
vate inputs in a privacy-preserving way. We assume that the n parties are con-
nected by perfectly secure channels in a synchronous network. We employ the
(t, n)-Shamir’s secret sharing scheme for representation of and secure compu-
tation on private values, by using which the computation of a function f(·)
can be divided into three stages. Stage I: Each party enters his input xi to the
computation using Shamir’s secret sharing. Stage II: The parties simulate the
circuit computing f(x1, . . . , xn), producing a new shared secret T whose value
is f(x1, . . . , xn). Stage III: At least t+ 1 shares of f(x1, . . . , xn) are sent to one
party, who reconstructs it. All operations are assumed to be performed in a
prime field Fp. When treating fixed point and floating point number operations,
we borrow the corresponding protocols in [13,14,15]. By using these protocols
we can treat the real number operations in a relatively precise way. Therefore,
in the paper we assume there are some fundamental real number operations
in MPC: addition, multiplication, division, comparison, exponentiation etc. For
more formal and general presentation of this approach please see [16,17].
2.2 Differential Privacy
Differential privacy of a function means that any change in a single individ-
ual input may only induce a small change in the distribution on its outcomes.
A differentially private function is a kind of randomized function. The related
definitions follow from the book [7].
Definition 1 (Randomized Function). A randomized function M with do-
main A and discrete range B is associated with a mapping M : A → ∆(B),
where ∆(B) denotes the set of all the probability distribution on B. On input
x ∈ A, the function M outputs M(x) = b with probability (M(x))b for each
b ∈ B. The probability space is over the coin flips of the function M.
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Definition 2 (Differential Privacy [8,7]). A randomized function M gives
(ǫ, δ)-differential privacy if for all datasets x and y differing on at most one
element, and all S ⊂ Range(M),
Pr[M(x) ∈ S] ≤ exp(ǫ)× Pr[M(y) ∈ S] + δ,
where the probability space is over the coin flips of the function M. If δ = 0, we
say that M is ǫ-differentially private.
There are mainly two ways to achieve differential privacy: noise mechanism
[8] and exponential mechanism [9]. Noise mechanism computes the desired func-
tion on the data and then adds noise proportional to the maximum change than
can be induced by changing a single element in the data set.
Definition 3 ([7]). The exponential mechanism M(x, u,R) outputs an ele-
ment r ∈ R with probability proportional to exp( ǫu(x,r)2∆u ). The Gaussian mech-
anism M(x, f) generates a random vector r = (r1, . . . , rn), where each ri ∼
N (fi(x), σ2), σ >
√
2 ln 1.25/δ∆2f/ǫ. The Laplace mechanism M(x, f) gen-
erates a random vector r = (r1, . . . , rn), where each ri ∼ Lap(fi(x), ∆f/ǫ),
Lap(fi(x), ∆f/ǫ) denotes the Laplace distribution with variance 2(∆f/ǫ)
2 and
mean fi(x).
Both the exponential mechanism and the Laplace mechanism satisfy ǫ-differential
privacy. The Gaussian mechanism satisfies (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy.
Any sequence of computations that each provide differential privacy in iso-
lation also provide differential privacy in sequence.
Lemma 1 (Sequential composition of DP [18]). LetMi is (ǫi, δi)-differentially
private. Then their combination, defined to be M1···n(x) = (M1, . . . ,Mn), is
(
∑
i ǫi,
∑
i δi)-differentially private.
Note that Lemma 1 is true not only whenM1, . . . ,Mn are run independently,
but even when subsequent computations can incorporate the outcomes of the
preceding computations [18].
2.3 Non-Uniform Random variate Generation
Non-uniform random variate generation studies how to generate random variates
drawn from a prescribed distribution function. In general, it assumes that there
exists a random variate, called it a seed, to generate randomness for the random
variates needed.
The Inversion Method [19] is an important method to generate random
variates, which is based upon the following property:
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Theorem 1. Let F be a continuous distribution function on R with inverse F−1
defined by
F−1(u) = inf{x : F (x) = u, 0 < u < 1}.
If U is a uniform [0, 1] random variate, then F−1(U) has distribution function
F . Also, if X has distribution function F , then F (X) is uniformly distributed
on [0, 1].
Theorem 1 [19, Theorem 2.1] can be used to generate random variates with
an arbitrary univariate continuous distribution function F provided that F−1 is
explicitly known. Formally, we have
Algorithm 1: The inversion method
input : None
output: A random variate drawn from F
1 Generate a uniform [0, 1] random variate U ;
2 return X ← F−1(U).
The Gibbs Sampling [20] is one Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algo-
rithm, a kind of algorithms widely used in statistics, scientific modeling, and
machine learning to estimate properties of complex distributions. For a distri-
bution function F , the Gibbs sampling generates a Markov chain {Ym}m≥0 with
F as its stationary distribution.
Let f(r1, . . . , rk) be the density function of F and let (R1, . . . , Rk) be a ran-
dom vector with distribution F . For r = (r1, r2, . . . , rk), let r(i) = (r1, r2, . . . , ri−1, ri+1, . . . , rk)
and pi(·|r(i)) be the conditional density of Ri given R(i) = r(i). Algorithm 2 gen-
erates a Markov chain {Ym}m≥0.
Algorithm 2: The Gibbs sampling algorithm
input : Set the initial values [R0j ]← [r0j ], j = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1
output: A random vector [Y ] with density f(r)
1 Generate a random variate [R0k] from the conditional density
pk(·|Rℓ = r0ℓ, ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1);
2 for i := 1 to m do
3 for j := 1 to k do
4 Generate a random variate [Rij ] from the conditional density
pj(·|Rℓ = siℓ, ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , k} \ {j}), where siℓ = riℓ for 1 ≤ ℓ < j and
siℓ = r(i−1)ℓ for j < ℓ ≤ k;
5 The parties output the random vector [Ym] = ([Rm1], . . . , [Rmk]).
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2.4 Notations
Throughout the paper, let [x] denote that the value x is secretly shared among
the parties by using Shamir’s secret sharing. Let s ∼ F denote the random
variate s follows the distribution function F .
3 The Security of Computing Randomized Function
In the section, we study the security of computing randomized function in the
distributed setting. We focus on in what condition can the computation of a
randomized function be reduced to a deterministic one. The results of the section
is vital to construct differentially private protocols.
We first give the definition of (statistically) indistinguishability.
Definition 4 (Indistinguishability [4]). Two probability ensembles X
def
=
{Xw}w∈S and Y def= {Yw}w∈S are called (statistically) indistinguishable, denoted
X ≡ Y , if for every positive polynomial p(·), every sufficiently large k, and every
w ∈ S ∩ {0, 1}k, it holds that
∑
α∈{0,1}∗
|Pr[Xw = α]− Pr[Yw = α]| < 1
p(k)
.
The security definition of protocols computing randomized functions mainly
follows from [4, Definition 7.5.1].
Definition 5. Let M(x) be an n-ary randomized function and let π(x) be an
n party protocol to compute M(x), where Mi(x) denotes the i-th element of
M(x). The view of the party Pi during an execution of π on (x, s), denoted
VIEWπi (x, s), is (xi, si,m1, . . . ,mt), where si ∼ Fi is a random variate Pi inputs,
and mj represents the j-th message it has received. The output of Pi after an exe-
cution of π on (x, s), denoted OUTPUTπi (x, s), is implicit in the party’s own view
of the execution, and OUTPUTπ(x, s) = (OUTPUTπ1 (x, s), . . . ,OUTPUT
π
n(x, s)).
For I = {i1, . . . , ik} ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, letMI(x) denote the subsequenceMi1(x), . . . ,Mik(x).
Let VIEWπI (x, s)
def
= {I,VIEWπi1(x, s), . . . ,VIEWπik(x, s)}. We say that π pri-
vately computes M if there exists an algorithm S, such that for every I ⊆
{1, . . . , n}, it holds that
{S(I, xI , FI ,MI(x)),M(x)}x ≡ {VIEWπI (x, s),OUTPUTπ(x, s)}x, (1)
where x = (x1, . . . , xn), xI = (xi1 , . . . , xik), (x, s) = ((x1, s1), . . . , (xn, sn)) and
FI = (Fi1 , . . . , Fik).
Throughout the paper, we assume that M1(x) = · · · = Mn(x) and that
OUTPUTπ1 (x, s) = · · · = OUTPUTπn(x, s). That is, each party obtains the same
output.
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We remark that the above definition is slightly different from Definition 7.5.1
in [4] that a private random variate s = (s1, . . . , sn) is input during the execution
of π. The role of s is to generate randomness in order to compute M(x) (since
M(x) is a randomized function). We call s a seed to compute the randomized
function M(x). By providing the seed s, Definition 5 try to capture the vital
characteristic of the process of computing randomized function in the distributed
setting, such as Example 1 and Example 2.
We define the notion of private reduction and cite a corresponding composi-
tion theorem. We refer the reader to [4,21] for further details.
Definition 6 (Privacy Reductions). An oracle aided protocol using an oracle
functionality f privately computes M if there exists a simulator S for each I as
in Definition 5. The corresponding views are defined in the natural manner to
include oracle answers. An oracle-aided protocol privately reduces M to f if it
privately computes M when using oracle functionality f .
Theorem 2 (Composition Theorem for the Semi-Honest Model[4]).
Suppose M is privately reducible to f and there exists a protocol for privately
computing f . Then, the protocol defined by replacing each oracle-call to f by a
protocol that privately computes f is a protocol for privately computing M.
3.1 Reducing Computation of Randomized Function to
Deterministic One
Given a randomized function M, let M(x, s′) denote the value of M(x) when
using a random seed s′ drawn from a distribution function F . That is, M(x)
is the randomized process consisting of selecting s′ ∼ F , and deterministically
computing M(x, s′). Let f be a deterministic function such that
f((x1, s1), . . . , (xn, sn))
def
= M(x, g(s)), (2)
where g is a deterministic function such that s′ = g(s), s = (s1, . . . , sn) and the
random variate si ∼ Fi. That is, in the distributed setting, we reduce computing
the randomized function M to computing the deterministic function f . In the
section, we consider the security problem induced by the reduction.
We now introduce the notion of obliviousness, which is important to privately
reduce the computation of randomized function to deterministic one.
Definition 7 (Obliviousness). With the notation denoted as Definition 5, the
seed s is said to be oblivious to π if for every I = {i1, . . . , ik} ⊂ {1, . . . , n} and
every s′I , there is
{OUTPUTπ(x, s)|sI = s′I}x ≡ {OUTPUTπ(x, s)}x,
where sI = (si1 , . . . , sik) and s
′
I is one admissible assignment to sI .
Lemma 2. With the notation denoted as Definition 5, if s is not oblivious to
π, then π is not secure to compute M.
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Proof. Assume that s is not oblivious to π. There then exist one I and one s′I
such that
{OUTPUTπ(x, s)|sI = s′I}x 6≡ {OUTPUTπ(x, s)}x.
Now imaging the following execution of π: The parties PI input fixed value s
′
I
for sI . For any simulator with input (xI ,MI , FI), who does not know sI =
s′I , it is unable to get the distribution function {OUTPUTπ(x, s)|sI = s′I}x.
Therefore, there exist one I and one s′I such that {OUTPUTπ(x, s)|sI = s′I}x
is unable to be simulated by any simulator. However, the above distribution
function is known to PI since they know the value sI = s
′
I , which implies that
(OUTPUTπ(x, s)|sI = s′I) ∈ VIEWI(x, s). Therefore, Equation (1) does not
hold for I and sI = s
′
I , for any simulator. Hence, π is not secure to computeM.
The claim is proved.
Obliviousness, which is a (no trivial) generalization of the notion “oblivi-
ously” in [22], says that the seed (of each party or each proper subgroup of the
parties) should be independent to the protocol’s output. In other words, the
execution of the protocol should be “oblivious” to the seed. One can verify that
both the (not secure) two protocols in Example 1 to generate Gaussian noise
and the (not secure) protocol in Example 2 to generate Laplace noise do not
satisfy the property of obliviousness.
Lemma 2 gives a necessary condition to the security of protocol computing
randomized function. Therefore, in order to reducing the computation of a ran-
domized function to deterministic one, the seed should not only be secret among
the parties but also be oblivious to the protocol’s output. In the following, we
give it a sufficient condition.
Lemma 3. Let M, s and f be defined as in Equation 2. Suppose that the fol-
lowing protocol, denoted π, is oblivious to s. Then it privately reduces M to f .
Protocol 3: privately reducing a randomized function to a deterministic
one
input : Pi gets xi
output: Each party outputs the oracle’s response
1 Step 1: Pi selects si ∼ Fi;
2 Step 2: Pi invokes the oracle of f with query (xi, si), and records the oracle
response.
Proof. Clearly, this protocol computes M. To show that π privately computes
M, we need to present a simulator SI for each group of parties Pi1 , . . . , Pik ’s
view. For notational simplicity, we only prove that there exists a simulator Si
for each party Pi. On input (xi, vi), where xi is the local input to Pi and vi
is its local output, the simulator selects si ∼ Fi, and outputs (xi, si, vi). The
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main observation underlying the analysis of this simulator is that for every fixed
x = (x1, . . . , xn) and s
′, we have v = M(x, s′) if and only if v = f(x, s), for
every s satisfying s′ = g(s). Now, let ξi be a random variable representing the
random choice of Pi in Step 1, and ξ
′
i denote the corresponding choice made by
the simulator Si. Then, referring to Equation 1, we show that for every fixed x,
si and v = (v1, . . . , vn), it holds that
Pr [VIEWπi (x, s) = (xi, si, vi) ∧OUTPUTπ(x, s) = v]
= Pr [(ξi = si) ∧OUTPUTπ(x, ξ) = f(x, ξ) = v]
= Pr [(ξi = si)] Pr [M(x) = v]
= Pr [(ξ′i = si)] Pr [M(x) = v]
= Pr [(ξ′i = si) ∧M(x) = v]
= Pr [Si(xi, Fi,Mi(x)) = (xi, si, vi) ∧M(x) = v]
where the equalities are justified as follows: the 1st by the definition of π, the
2nd by the obliviousness of π to ξ and the definition of f , the 3rd by definition
of ξi and ξ
′
i, the 4th by the independence of ξ
′ andM, and the 5th by definition
of Si. Thus, the simulated view (and output) is distributed identically to the
view (and output) in a real execution.
Similarly, for each group of parties Pi1 , . . . , Pik ’s view, there exists a simulator
S such that Equation 1 holds.
The proof is complete.
We remark that the proof technique in Lemma 3 is borrowed from [4, Propo-
sition 7.3.4].
By combining Theorem 2, Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, we have the following
theorem.
Theorem 3. Let Equation 2 hold and let π(x, s) be a secure protocol to compute
f(x, s). Then π(x, ·) privately compute M(x) if and only if π(x, s) is oblivious
to s.
Theorem 3 holds for differentially private functions since the later is a kind of
randomized functions. Therefore, Theorem 3 gives a necessary and sufficient con-
dition about how to privately compute differentially private functions. Theorem
3 can not only be used to determine whether a protocol computing differentially
private function is secure, such as the protocols in Example 1 and Example 2,
but also be used to construct secure one, such as those protocols in Section 5.
4 Multiparty Differential Privacy
For an (ǫ, δ)-differentially private function and a protocol computing it in the
distributed setting, we are willing to see that the protocol has inherited the (ǫ, δ)-
differential privacy property of the function it computes. It is intuitive that if the
protocol privately compute the function it will inherit the property naturally. In
the section, we will prove that this is the fact.
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We first introduce the notion of differential privacy in the distributed setting,
which says that the view of each party (or each subgroup of the parties) is
differentially private in respect to other parties’ inputs.
Definition 8 (Multiparty differential privacy [23]). Let the notations be
denoted as Definition 5. We say that x = (x1, . . . , xn) and y = (y1, . . . , yn)
differ on at most one element if there exists i0 such that xi = yi for all i ∈
{1, . . . , n} \ {i0} and that xi0 , yi0 differ on at most one element. The protocol
π is said to be (ǫ, δ)-differentially private if for all datasets x, y differing on at
most one element, for all S, and for all I ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n} \ {i0},
Pr [(VIEWπI (x, s),OUTPUT
π
I (x, s)) ∈ S] ≤ exp(ǫ)×Pr [(VIEWπI (y, s),OUTPUTπI (y, s)) ∈ S]+δ.
(3)
Theorem 4. Assume that M is an (ǫ, δ)-differentially private algorithm and
that π is a protocol to privately compute M in the distributed setting. Then π is
(ǫ, δ)-differentially private.
Proof. For notational simplicity, we only prove the case of I ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. The
general case can be treated similarly. We inherit the notations from Definition
8.
Since M(x) is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private, we have
Pr[M(x) ∈ S¯] ≤ exp(ǫ)× Pr[M(y) ∈ S¯] + δ. (4)
Then for all S′ and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {i0},
Pr[(xi,M(x)) ∈ S′] ≤ exp(ǫ)× Pr[(yi,M(y)) ∈ S′] + δ,
since xi = yi.
Therefore, for all (post-processing [7, page 229]) algorithm Si and all domain
S′′,
Pr[Si(xi,M(x)) ∈ S′′] ≤ exp(ǫ)× Pr[Si(yi,M(y)) ∈ S′′] + δ.
On the other hand, since π(x) is a protocol to privately compute M(x), there
exists an algorithm S¯i such that
{S¯i(xi,M(x))}x ≡ {VIEWπi (x, s)}x.
Combining the last two formulas, we have
Pr[VIEWπi (x, s) ∈ S′′] ≤ exp(ǫ)× Pr[VIEWπi (y, s) ∈ S′′] + δ. (5)
Moreover, since OUTPUTπi (x, s) is implicit in VIEW
π
i (x, s) (see Definition 5),
the later can be seen as a post-processing of the former. Therefore, for all x,
Pr [(VIEWπi (x, s),OUTPUT
π
i (x, s)) ∈ S] = Pr[VIEWπi (x, s) ∈ S′′] (6)
Inputting Equation (6) into Equation (5), we have Equation (3).
The proof is complete.
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The following theorem provides the sequential composition property to dif-
ferentially private protocols.
Theorem 5 (Composition theorem). Assume that the protocol πi privately
computes (ǫi, δi)-differentially private algorithm Mi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then their
composition, defined to be π1···n = (π1, . . . , πn), is (
∑
i ǫi,
∑
i δi)-differentially
private.
Proof. Since each πi is secure to compute Mi, then their combination π1···n is
secure to compute M1···n by Theorem 2. By Theorem 4 and Lemma 1 we have
π1···n is (
∑
i ǫi,
∑
i δi)-differentially private.
Note that, by Lemma 1, Theorem 5 is true not only when π1, . . . , πn are
run independently, but even when subsequent computations can incorporate the
outcomes of the preceding computations.
5 Protocol Construction
In this section, we use the results in Section 3 to construct secure protocols
to compute randomized functions. We first design a protocol to generate the
uniform random variate and a protocol to implement the inversion method in
the distributed setting. Then we construct secure protocols to implement the
Laplace mechanism and the exponential mechanism. Importantly, all of these
protocols satisfy the property of obliviousness.
Recall that, we let [x] denote that the value x is secretly shared among the
parties by using Shamir’s secret sharing.
5.1 Multiparty Inversion Method
We first provide Protocol 4 to generate random variate X drawn from the
Bernoulli Bern(1/2) distribution in the distributed setting, where X takes on
only two values: 0 and 1, both with probability 1/2. Protocol 4 uses the fact
that the XOR of two Bernoulli Bern(1/2) random variates is also a Bernoulli
Bern(1/2) random variate.
Protocol 4: Multiparty generation of Bernoulli Bern(1/2) random variate
input : None
output: The parties obtain a random variate [X] drawn from Bern(1/2)
1 The party Pi generates a random bit si drawn from the Bernoulli Bern(1/2)
distribution by flipping an unbiased coin and shares it among the parties, for
1 ≤ i ≤ n;
2 The parties compute [X]← ⊕ni=1[si] and output it, where ⊕ denote XOR
operation.
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We give Protocol 5 to generate random variate drawn from the standard
Gaussian distribution N (0, 1) in the distributed setting. The protocol approxi-
mates the Gaussian distribution N (0, 1) by using the central limit theorem.
Protocol 5: Multiparty generation of Gaussian N (0, 1) random variate
input : None
output: The parties obtain a random variate [X] drawn from N (0, 1)
1 The parties generate k independent random variates [s1], . . . , [sk] drawn from
the Bernoulli Bern(1/2) distribution by invoking Protocol 4;
2 The parties compute [Y ]←∑ki=1[si];
3 The parties compute [X]← ([Y ]− k/2)/(√k/2).
We now use Protocol 5 to design Protocol 6 to generate random variate drawn
from the uniform distribution U(0, 1) in the distributed setting. Protocol 6 uses
the result in Theorem 1.
Protocol 6: Multiparty generation of Uniform U(0, 1) random variate
input : None
output: The parties obtain a random variate [X] drawn from U(0, 1)
1 The parties generate a random variate [ξ] drawn from N (0, 1) by using Protocol
5 ;
2 The parties compute [X]← [G(ξ)], where G(x) is the distribution function of
N (0, 1). Note that [G(ξ)] = 1
2
+ [ 1√
2π
∫ ξ
0
exp
(
− t2
2
)
dt] where the second
summand can be evaluated as follows by using the composite trapezoidal method
[24]. Set f(t) = 1√
2π
exp
(
− t2
2
)
and Y =
∫ ξ
0
f(t)dt.
1. The parties negotiate a step length h and a positive integer k such that kh = 1;
2. Each party computes ti = hi for i ∈ {0, . . . , k} separately;
3. The parties compute [t′i] = ti[ξ] for i ∈ {0, . . . , k};
4. The parties compute f([t′i]) for i ∈ {0, . . . , k};
5. The parties compute [Y ]← h[ξ](f(0) + f([ξ]) + 2∑k−1i=1 f([t′i]))/2.
The inversion method presented in Algorithm 1 is an important method
to generate univariate random variable. We now give its new edition in the dis-
tributed setting as shown in Protocol 7. Protocol 7 is a powerful and fundamental
protocol to construct other complex protocols, such as protocols of the Gaussian
mechanism, the Laplace mechanism and the exponential mechanism as shown
in the followings.
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Protocol 7: Multiparty inversion method
input : The univariate continuous distribution function F (t)
output: The parties obtain a random variate [X] drawn from F (t)
1 The parties generate a random number [ξ] drawn from U(0, 1) by using Protocol
6 ;
2 The parties compute [X]← F−1([ξ]). Note that F−1([ξ]), if it has an explicit
expression, can be computed by using the non-decreasing property of F (t) and
the comparison operator. When F−1([ξ]) = t only has implicit integral
expression, i.e., [ξ] =
∫ t
−∞ f(s)ds, it can be computed as follows.
1. The parties compute [ξ′]← [ξ]− ∫ 0−∞ f(s)ds =
∫ t
0
f(s)ds;
2. The parties choose two values [a], [b] such that
∫ a
0
f(s)ds ≤ ξ′ ≤ ∫ b
0
f(s)ds by
using the non-decreasing property of
∫ t
0
f(s)ds and the comparison operator;
3. The parties evaluate [t] in the equation [ξ′] =
∫ t
0
f(s)ds by using the bisection
method [24] over the initial interval [a, b];
4. The parties set [X]← [t];
5.2 Multiparty Differentially Private Protocols
We now use the protocols of generating random variates to construct protocols
of the Laplace mechanism and the exponential mechanism.
Multiparty Gaussian Mechanism We give Protocol 5 to generate random
variate drawn from the Gaussian distribution N (f(x), σ2) in the distributed
setting, which achieves Gaussian mechanism. The protocol approximates the
Gaussian distribution N (0, σ2) by using the central limit theorem [20, Corollary
11.1.3].
Protocol 8: Multiparty Gaussian Mechanism
input : Each party Pi shares his input xi among the parites
output: The parties obtain a random variate random vector
[X] = ([X1], . . . , [Xn]) drawn from
∏n
j=1N (fj(x), σ2)
1 for j := 1 to n do
2 The parties generate k independent random variates [s1], . . . , [sk] drawn
from the Bernoulli Bern(1/2) distribution by invoking Protocol 4;
3 The parties compute [Yi]← σ[si] for 1 ≤ i ≤ k;
4 The parties compute [Y¯ ]←∑ki=1[Yi]/k;
5 The parties compute [X ′j ]←
√
k([Y¯ ]− σ/2);
6 The parties set [Xj ]← [fj(x)] + [X ′j ].
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Multiparty Laplace Mechanism The Laplace mechanism in the distributed
setting is shown in Protocol 9.
Protocol 9: Multiparty Laplace Mechanism
input : Each party Pi secretly shares his input xi among the parties
output: The parties obtain a random vector [X] = ([X1], . . . , [Xn]) drawn from∏n
j=1 Lap(fj(x),∆f/ǫ)
1 for j := 1 to n do
2 The parties generate a random variate [ξj ] drawn from Lap(∆f/ǫ) by using
Protocol 7(F (t)), where F (t) = ǫ
2∆f
∫ t
−∞ exp(− ǫ|s|∆f )ds;
3 The parties set [Xj ]← [fj(x)] + [ξj ].
Multiparty Exponential mechanism When the rangeR is a finite set, we set
R = {r1, . . . , r|R|}. The aim of the exponential mechanism is to draw a random
element r ∈ R with probability exp( ǫu(x,r)2∆u ). Protocol 10 achieves the aim whose
main idea is the sequential search algorithm in [19, page 85]. In Protocol 10, the
comparison function LT([S], [ξ]) = 1 if S < ξ and LT([S], [ξ]) = 0 if S ≥ ξ.
Protocol 10: Multiparty discrete Exponential mechanism
input : Each party Pi secretly shares his input xi among the parties
output: The parties obtain a random variate [X] on R with probability mass
function exp( ǫu(x,R)
2∆u
), where x = (x1, . . . , xn) and R = {1, 2, . . . , |R|}
1 The parties compute [pi]← [exp( ǫu(x,i)2∆u )] for each i ∈ R;
2 The parties generate a random variate [U ] drawn from U(0, 1) by using Protocol
6;
3 The parties compute [ξ]← [U ]× [∑i∈R pi];
4 The parties set [X]← 1, [S]← [p1];
5 for k := 2 to |R| do
6 The parties compute [X]← [X] + LT([S], [ξ]);
7 The parties compute [S]← [S] + [pi];
8 The parties output [X].
When R is a set of high dimensional continuous random vectors, we can use
the Gibbs sampling algorithm.
LetR = {(r1, . . . , rk) : ri ∈ R for 1 ≤ i ≤ k}. Setting α =
∫
r∈R exp(
ǫu(x,r)
2∆u )dr,
then f(r) = 1
α
exp( ǫu(x,r)2∆u ) is a density function on R. The Gibbs sampling
method generates a Markov chain {Rm}m≥0 with f(r) as its stationary density.
Let
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pi(·|r(i)) = f(r1, r2, . . . , ri−1, ·, ri+1, . . . , rk)∫
x∈R f(r1, r2, . . . , ri−1, x, ri+1, . . . , rk)dx
.
Note that pi(·|r(i)) is a univariate density function. Protocol 11 outputs a
random vector R drawn from the density f(r), which uses the multiparty edition
of Algorithm 2.
Protocol 11: The multiparty high dimensional exponential mechanism
input : Each party Pi secretly shares his input xi among the parties; The
parties obtain the initial values [R0j ]← [r0j ], j = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1
output: A random vector R drawn from f(r)
1 The parties generate a random variate [R0k] from the conditional density
pk(·|Xℓ = r0ℓ, ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1);
2 for i := 1 to m do
3 for j := 1 to k do
4 The parties generate a random variate [Rij ] from the conditional
density pj(·|Xℓ = siℓ, ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , k} \ {j}) by using Protocol 7, where
siℓ = riℓ for 1 ≤ ℓ < j and siℓ = r(i−1)ℓ for j < ℓ ≤ k;
5 The parties output the random vector [Rm] = ([Rm1], . . . , [Rmk]).
5.3 Security and Privacy Analysis
The security of the protocols in Section 5 can be analyzed by Lemma 3. Given
a randomized functionM, we first select s′ ∼ F , and deterministically compute
M(x, s′). Let f be a deterministic function satisfying Equation 2. By Lemma
3, if there is a protocol π privately computing f and that π(·, s) is oblivious to
s ∼ F , then π(x, ·) is secure to compute M(x) by inputting the seed s ∼ F .
Since the paper focuses on computing randomized functions in the distributed
setting and in order to keep the readability, the protocols in the section are pre-
sented in an algorithmic manner but not explicitly presented in the mathematical
operations like [15]. The involved sub-protocols to compute some fundamental
operations, e.g., addition, multiplication, XOR, comparison and exponentiation
etc., and the sub-protocols to compute some fundamental algorithms, e.g., the
bisection method and the composite trapezoidal method, can be achieved by the
works in [14,13,15], which would be as one future work. Therefore, in the paper,
we assume that each deterministic function can be privately computed. Hence,
to prove the security of the protocols in Section 5, we only need to prove the
correctness and obliviousness of these protocols.
Semi-Honest Model Obliviousness: All the protocols in Section 5 satisfy the
property of obliviousness. This is because of seeds needed in these protocols
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are all input through invoking Protocol 4. However, it can be easily verified
that Protocol 4 satisfies the property of obliviousness. Therefore, other protocols
inherit the obliviousness of Protocol 4.
Correctness: Protocol 4 is due to the fact that the XOR of two Bernoulli
Bern(1/2) random variates is also a Bernoulli Bern(1/2) random variate. There-
fore, ⊕ni=1bi is a Bern(1/2) random variate since each bi is a Bern(1/2) random
variate. The correctness of Protocol 5 is due to the central limit theorem [20,
Corollary 11.1.3]. The correctness of Protocol 6 is due to Theorem 1: If the ran-
dom variate ξ is drawn from N (0, 1), then G(ξ) is drawn from U(0, 1), where
G(x) = 1√
2π
∫ x
−∞ exp
(
− t22
)
dt is the distribution function of N (0, 1). The cor-
rectness of Protocol 7 is due to the classical inversion method, i.e., Algorithm 1.
In Protocol 8, Step 2 to Step 5 generate a random variateX ′ ∼ N (0, σ2) by using
the central limit theorem [20, Corollary 11.1.3]. Then fj(x)+X
′
j ∼ N (fj(x), σ2).
Protocol 9 is due to the Laplace mechanism in Definition 3. Protocol 10 is due
to the sequential search algorithm in [19, page 85]. The correctness of Protocol
11 uses the correctness of Algorithm 2.
Corollary 1. Protocol 8 is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private. Protocol 9, Protocol 10
and Protocol 11 are all ǫ-differentially private.
Proof. This is a direct corollary of Theorem 4.
Malicious Model By forcing parties to behave in an effectively semi-honest
manner, we can transform the above protocols in the semi-honest model into
protocols secure in the malicious-behavior model. The above process needs some
preliminaries: the commitment schemes, zero-knowledge proof techniques and
the Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS) scheme. In the paper we do not intend to
give it a detailed construction but as a future work. Besides of these, we consider
the malicious behavior in computing seeds. Seeds are generated bit by bit by
invoking Protocol 4, in which a malicious party may input either a non-bit
random element or a non-uniform random bit. The first malicious behavior can
be avoided by verifying the input x satisfies x2 = x. The second malicious
behavior can be solved by first generating a public random variate drawn from
Bern(1/2) and then XOR it with the output of Protocol 4 by the fact that the
XOR of two random bits is uniform so long as one of which is uniform.
5.4 Optimal Complexity
By Section 3, each party P1 should input a seed si, a random variate, to the
protocol π for computing a randomized functionM to generate the randomness
of the final output. We call s = (s1, . . . , sn) a seed of π for computing M and
call the number of bit in s, denoted |s|, the length of s. Each protocol in Section
5 takes independent random bit sequence as its seed. Note that the length of the
seed is an important indicator of the complexity of the protocol, the minimum
length of the seed is of special interest.
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We now discuss the minimum length of the seeds of all the protocols for
generating independent random bits.
Theorem 6. Let π be a protocol to privately compute the randomized func-
tion M of generating random vector v = (v1, . . . , vk), where v1, . . . , vk ∼i.i.d
Bern(1/2). Let si = (si1, . . . , siℓi) be the seed of Pi, where each sij denotes a bit.
Then ℓi ≥ k for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Therefore, the protocol π′ of independent k times execution of Protocol 4 has
the shortest seed among all the protocols for privately computing M.
Proof. Let notations be denoted as Equation 2 and Definition 7. Since π should
satisfy obliviousness, then for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and each admissible value s′ı¯
of sı¯, we have
{OUTPUTπ(x, s)|sı¯ = s′ı¯}x ≡ {OUTPUTπ(x, s)}x,
where sı¯ = (s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sn).
For the (n+ 1)-ary deterministic function M(x, s), let gi(si) :=M(x, s|x =
x′, sı¯ = s′ı¯) denote the univariate deterministic function about si when x =
x′, sı¯ = s′ı¯. Then gi : {0, 1}ℓi → {0, 1}k. Assume that ℓi < k and, without loss of
generality, set ℓi = k− 1. Set S = {gi(y) : y ∈ {0, 1}k−1}. Since |S| ≤ 2k−1 < 2k,
there would have at lease 2k−1 elements of {0, 1}k not contained in S. Letting
gi(si) = (Y1 · · ·Yk), where Y1, . . . , Yk ∼i.i.d Bern(1/2), for any k-bit sequence
y1 · · · yk /∈ S, we have
k∏
j=1
Pr[Yj = yj] = Pr[Y1 · · ·Yk = y1 · · · yk] = 0.
Therefore, there exists one j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, such that Pr[Yj = yj ] = 0, which is
contrary to the assumption that (Y1 · · ·Yk) are random bits. Therefore, ℓi ≥ k
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
On the other hand, the length of the seed of π′ is nk. Therefore, it has the
shortest seed among all the protocols privately compute M.
The claim is proved.
Theorem 6 shows one intrinsic bound on optimizing the complexity of those
protocols for computing randomized functions by invoking Protocol 4 and shows
that our protocols in the section reach the bound.
5.5 Application to Empirical Risk Minimization
Our protocols are fundamental and powerful to construct other complex differ-
entially private protocols. We now use our protocols to construct a differentially
private empirical risk minimization (ERM) protocol in the distributed setting.
We consider a differentially private (ERM) algorithm [25, Algorithm 1]. For
Algorithm 1 in [25], we can add a noise vector to the output of argminf J(f,D)
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in order to achieve differential privacy, where
J(f,D) = 1
k
k∑
i=1
ℓ(f(xi), yi) + ΛN(f).
If the added noise vector b is drawn from 1
α
exp(−λ||b||) the output satisfies
differential privacy, where λ = 2
kΛǫ
.
In the distributed setting, let the dataset D = {(xj , yj)} is partitioned into
n parts D1, . . . ,Dn, where the party Pi owns Di. Each party Pi first shares its
dataset Di among the parties. Then the parties approximately compute a share
[f ] of the minimizer of J(f, ([D1], . . . , [Dn])) by using a deterministic function
evaluation protocol. (Since the paper focuses on randomized function evaluation
protocols, we omit to construct the protocol of computing [f ].) The parties now
use Protocol 12 to generate a random vector [X ] drawn from 1
α
exp(−λ||b||),
where Protocol 12 is a multiparty edition of the polar method in [19, page 225].
The parties then compute [X+f ]. Finally, the parties recover and output X+f ,
which would be a differentially private ERM in the distributed setting.
Protocol 12: Multiparty generation of random variate drawn from
f(x1, . . . , xd) =
1
α
e−λ
√
x2
1
+...+x2d
input : None
output: A random variate [X] drawn from f(x1, . . . , xd) =
1
α
e−λ
√
x2
1
+...+x2
d
1 The parties generate i.i.d normal randoms [N1], . . . , [Nd] by Protocol 5;
2 The parties compute a share of random vector [X ′]← ([N1
S
], . . . , [Nd
S
]), where
S ←√N21 + · · ·+N2d ;
3 The parties generate a random variate [R] drawn from the density dVdr
d−1g(r)
(r ≥ 0) by using Protocol 7, where Vd = πd/2Γ (d/2+1) and g(x) = 1αe−λx ;
4 The parties compute [X]← [RX ′].
6 Related Work
Secure multiparty computation [14,13,21,4] studies how to privately compute
functions in the distributed setting. The computation of randomized function,
such as random variate generation, is seldom studied in MPC. Until recently,
the development of DP in the distributed setting makes the study of the compu-
tation of randomized functions necessary in MPC. Except the works mentioned
in Section 1, other former works are presented as follows.
Proposition 7.3.4 in [4] privately reduces computing randomized function to
a deterministic one. However, it does not give criterion about what kind of seed,
which is used to generates the randomness, is secure. That is, the criterion for
how to determine a protocol computing a randomized function is secure is not
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given. Our conclusion gives a sufficient and necessary condition (Theorem 3)
about it and therefore gives the criterion, i.e., obliviousness. Furthermore, obliv-
iousness gives some clue on finding more (efficient) reduction protocols except
the one in [4, Proposition 7.3.4]. Note also that the randomized functions the
paper considers are confided to be n-ary functions having the same value for all
components.
The notion of obliviousness can be seen as a (no trivial) generation of the
notion Obliviously in [22]. However, they have one major difference: Obliviously
emphasises on the independence of the seed to the execution of the protocol
computing the randomized function, where as obliviousness focus on the inde-
pendence of the seed to the output of the protocol computing the deterministic
function, to which the randomized function is privately reduced. The advantage
of the later is that it separates the choosing of the seed from the execution of
the protocol computing the deterministic function, which makes the design and
the analysis of the protocol computing randomized function easy to do.
[26] gives two protocols to generate Gaussian random variate and Laplace
random variate in the distributed setting, which are used to compute differen-
tially private summation functions. Although Protocol 5 in our paper is similar
with the one in [26] to generate Gaussian random variate, our work focus mainly
on the fundamental theory and fundamental tools to compute randomized func-
tions in the distributed setting and is therefore different from theirs.
Random Value Protocol [22] is a two-party protocol to generate uniform ran-
dom integers from ZN while keeping N secret, which is used to approximately
generate uniform random variate [11,27] following U(0, 1) in the two-party set-
ting. It satisfies obliviousness but is too complicated that we can not see a way
to extend it to a multiparty one. Furthermore, the distributed exponential mech-
anism protocols in [11,27] are two special instantiations of Protocol 10.
[15] presents a protocol to implement exponential mechanism, in which a
sub-protocol is needed to generate uniform random variate drawn from the uni-
form distribution U(0, 1). In order to generate such uniform random variate,
the parties first secretly generate a uniform (γ + 1)-bit integer using the pro-
tocol RandInt(γ + 1). Then this integer is considered to be fractional part of
fixed point number, whose integer part is 0. Afterwards, the fixed point num-
ber is converted to floating point by a secure protocol, which is output as the
final result. The above protocol to generate uniform random number has two
drawbacks. First, the invoked protocol RandInt(γ + 1), borrowed from [28,29],
generates a uniform random element in Zp by the modular sum of the uniform
random elements in Zp generated by each of the parties. Note that the modular
sum of two uniform random elements in Zp is, in general, not a uniform random
elements in Zp [22]. Therefore, RandInt(γ+1) (most probably) generates a non-
uniform random (γ+1)-bit integer, which in turn leads to the non-uniformity of
the one in [15]. Second, since γ is predetermined, the random number generated
may not get value from many sub-intervals of [0, 1], such as the sub-interval
(0, 2−γ−1). Therefore, strictly speaking, the above method may not generate a
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random number with range [0, 1]. Of course, the uniform property in the range
[0, 1] of the generated random number will be not satisfied.
[23,30] studies the accuracy difference in computing Boolean functions be-
tween the client-server setting and the distributed setting. [31] introduces the
notion of computational differential privacy in the two-party setting. [5] studies
the influence to the accuracy of computing binary sum, gap threshold etc., when
both of differentially private analyses and the construction of protocol are con-
sidered simultaneously, which is contrary to the paradigm we use in which we
first analyze a problem using differentially private algorithm and then construct
corresponding protocol to compute it.
Differential privacy is a rigorous and promising privacy model. Much works
have been done in differentially private data analysis [32,33,34,25,35,36,37,38,39].
Our work tries to extend these algorithms to the distributed setting. It constructs
fundamental theory, such as Theorem 4 and Theorem 5, and fundamental tools,
such as the protocols in Section 5, about it.
Non-uniform Random variate generation [19] is a well developed field in
computer science and statistics. It studies how to generate non-uniform random
variate drawn from the prescribed distribution function. Some work of the paper
studies secure random variate generation in the distributed setting. It redesigns
the traditional random variate generation protocols to adapt to the distributed
setting. Note that most powerful algorithms, such as the rejection method, are
not fit for the distributed setting.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
The paper tried to answer in what condition can a protocol inherit the differential
privacy property of a function it computes and how to construct such protocol.
We proved that the differential privacy property of a function can be inherited
by the protocol computing it if the protocol privately computes it. Then a the-
orem provided the sufficient and necessary condition of privately computing a
randomized function (and so differentially private function) from a determinis-
tic one. The above result can not only be used to determine whether a protocol
computing differentially private function is secure, but also be used to construct
secure one. In obtaining these results, the notion obliviousness plays a vital role,
which captures the key security problems when computing a randomized func-
tion from a deterministic one in the distributed setting. However, we can not
prove the assertion that a protocol can not inherit the differential privacy prop-
erty of the function it computes if the protocol does not satisfy obliviousness.
We tend to a negative answer to the assertion.
The theoretical results in Section 3 and Section 4 is fundamental and powerful
to multiparty differential privacy. By using these results, some fundamental dif-
ferentially private protocols, such as protocols for Gaussian mechanism, Laplace
mechanism and Exponential mechanism, are constructed in Section 5. By using
these fundamental protocols, differentially private protocols for many complex
problems, such as the empirical risk minimization problem, can be constructed
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with little effort. Therefore, our results can be seen as a foundation and a pool
of necessary tools for multiparty differential privacy.
Furthermore, obliviousness is of independent interest to MPC. The deep
meaning of it in the security of computing randomized function is still needed to
be explored. Theorem 6 shows the intrinsic complexity of the method the paper
use to achieve obliviousness, i.e., bits XOR. Finding other efficient method to
achieve obliviousness is therefore an important topic to reduce protocols’ com-
plexity.
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